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Key Points 
 Although reduced in number since the appointment of the first EU Special 
Representative twenty years ago, these senior diplomatic envoys continue to play a 
valuable role in the EU’s foreign and security policy. Yet the perception remains that 
they are appreciated more by the EU member states than by the EU institutional 
system where their status within the EEAS remains ambiguous. More needs to be 
done to ensure that they are effectively anchored in the EU institutional system and 
that maximum use is made of the added value they can bring to the EU foreign and 
security policy machinery. 
 The High Representative/Vice President’s intention to terminate the ‘double-hatted’ 
model, while perceived as a logical consequence of the Lisbon Treaty, is causing 
tensions with the EU member states that remain to be convinced on the viability of 
this approach. There is a danger that if not properly managed, it could undermine the 
element of continuity in the work undertaken by the EUSRs in the countries 
concerned.  
 The welcome focus in the EU Global Security Strategy on an enhanced role for the EU 
in peace-building will require a comprehensive action plan to ensure that both the EU 
delegations and the EUSRs, who are singled out in this context, have the resources 
and capacity to respond to this challenge.  
 The EU’s commitment to supporting the role of civil society in conflict situations 
remains haphazard, with the failure to engage with civil society in the ongoing 
political crisis in Macedonia being a classic example of how it should not be done. 
Will the commitment contained in the EU Global Security Strategy, in relation to pre-
emptive diplomacy and conflict resolution, to interact with civil society be more than 
just ‘window dressing’ and make a real difference on the ground? 
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Policy Recommendations 
1. The EUSR system should be maintained, but with additional efforts to anchor the 
EUSRs in the EU institutional system, improve management structures, streamline 
staff resources, and ensure maximum synergy between the EUSRs and the various 
components of the EU institutions in accordance with the objective of coherence in 
the EU foreign and security policy. 
2. With the nine current EUSRs being all male, more attention should be paid to 
achieving greater gender balance in the appointments of EUSRs. 
3. A debriefing mechanism similar to that existing in the OSCE Secretariat should be 
established to ensure continuity and institutional memory after the termination of 
each EUSR mandate. 
4. The proposal to terminate the ‘double-hatted’ model will require careful 
management to ensure that the EU member states are on board; it should only be 
undertaken in a progressive manner on a case-by-case basis and once the necessary 
additional budgetary implications for the respective EU delegations have been 
guaranteed. 
5. The welcome focus of the EU’s Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy on 
peace-building, and in particular preventive diplomacy and mediation, will require 
a plan of action that includes the following two elements: 
a)  EU Delegations and Special Representatives need to be equipped with sufficient 
resources and, particularly in the case of the former, given targeted training in 
early warning and mediation techniques. 
b)  Interaction with civil society should become more systematic and form an 
integral part of the preventive diplomacy and mediation process.  
6. The appointment of an EUSR for the Balkan region as well as one for migration and 
the refugee crisis should be considered.  
Introduction 
Twenty years have passed since the 
appointment of the first EU Special 
Representative (EUSR). In March 1996, 
Aldo Ajello was appointed EU Special 
Envoy for the African Great Lakes region 
(Council Joint Action 96/250/CFSP). 
Conceived at a time when the EU’s foreign 
and security policy mechanisms were still 
thin on the ground, the appointment was 
seen as a means of ensuring both a voice 
and political presence for the European 
Union in a region wracked by conflict. 
While the European Commission had an 
extensive network of delegations already in 
place throughout Africa at that time, with 
their main focus on development 
assistance, trade and institution building, 
they were not seen by the EU member 
states as primary actors on EU foreign and 
security policy issues. 
The number of appointments of EUSRs 
grew in subsequent years, with almost 50 
senior diplomats appointed to date in a 
succession of EUSR positions. Today there 
are nine EUSRs in office covering countries 
and regions across Europe and beyond, 
from the Western Balkans, to the Middle 
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East, the Caucasus and Central Asia as well 
as Africa. They include three ‘double-
hatted’ representatives (merging the 
functions of EUSR and Head of Delegation) 
and one responsible for Human Rights, the 
only one designated for a policy area as 
opposed to a country or a region.1 
From the Amsterdam to the Lisbon 
Treaties 
With the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty 
formalising the practice of appointing 
EUSRs (Art. 18.5 of the TEU stated: “The 
Council, may, wherever it deems it 
necessary, appoint a special representative 
with a mandate in relation to particular 
policy issues.”), the EUSR system grew into 
an extensive autonomous instrument at the 
service of EU foreign and security policy. 
Little attention was paid, however, to 
management procedures or formalised 
links within the EU institutional 
organigramme.  
Despite or perhaps because of this rather 
loose ad-hoc institutional arrangement, the 
EUSR network became an important and 
indeed resilient resource of senior policy 
advisers and diplomats. They were seen, 
particularly by the EU member states, as 
providing added value to the EU’s 
effectiveness as a viable foreign policy actor 
and contributing to strengthening the 
image and visibility of the EU in the field, 
particularly on political and security issues 
in countries and regions prone to conflict. 
Whatever wariness existed within the EU 
                                                   
1  Afghanistan, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 
Kosovo ( all three ‘double-hatted’ and based in 
the respective capital city), Central Asia, 
Middle East Peace Process, the South Caucasus 
and crisis in Georgia, Horn of Africa, Sahel and 
Human Rights ( all based in Brussels). 
2  The FPI, although part of the Commission 
services and therefore under the authority of 
the HR, in her capacity as Vice President of the 
European Commission, appears in the EEAS 
institutions on the role of EUSRs was 
tempered by the advantages of the extra 
revenue that the EUSR system was 
generating for the overall management of 
EU foreign policy, with the financing 
coming from the operational expenditure 
of the CFSP budget administered by the 
Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 
(FPI) of the European Commission.2  
The Lisbon Treaty confirmed the continuity 
of the EUSR system (Art. 33 of the TEU), 
while at the same time establishing the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) 
and transforming the existing EC 
delegations into EU delegations with a 
much broader and more political remit. 
This left many questions unanswered, not 
least what place would the EUSRs have in 
the new institutional arrangements post-
Lisbon.  
From Ashton to Mogherini 
The first High Representative for EU 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and 
Vice President of the European 
Commission (the new post established 
under the Lisbon Treaty), Baroness Ashton, 
proposed in her 2013 Review of the 
organisation and functioning of the EEAS, 
that the EUSRs be “fully integrated within 
the EEAS while retaining a close link to the 
member states via the PSC” (Political and 
Security Committee). 3  Leaving aside the 
fact that this would have required an 
amendment to the TEU and the Council 
organigramme and is physically located in the 
EEAS building.  
3  See the Review at http://eeas.europa.eu/ 
library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_revie
w_en.pdf. The Political and Security 
Committee, authorised under Art. 38 TEU and 
composed of a representative from each EU 
member state, is a Committee of the Council of 
the European Union dealing with the common 
foreign and security policy (CFSP). 
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decision on the EEAS,4 it was no secret that 
Baroness Ashton viewed the EUSR system 
with some suspicion, fuelled by the 
knowledge that real control over EUSRs 
was in the hands of the member states 
through the PSC. It was in that same year 
that Baroness Ashton terminated the 
mandate of several EUSRs with little 
advance notice either to the member states 
or to the EUSRs themselves. Her actions 
became a source of contention with the 
member states, some of which feared that 
her intention was to ultimately phase out 
more, if not all, EUSRs.5 
The situation has evolved since then with 
the new HR/VP, Federica Mogherini, who 
took up office in November 2014, adopting 
a more open attitude towards EUSRs and 
their place in the EU foreign and security 
policy machinery. In her letter addressed to 
the PSC on 7 October 2015, she confirmed 
that she fully subscribed to the views 
expressed (in the evaluation exercise she 
had undertaken) on “the usefulness of 
EUSRs as a flexible EU instrument to attain 
our political objectives and increase our 
visibility”. She also stated that the idea of 
incorporating the EUSRs into the EEAS 
“has evolved into the notion of a functional 
integration where the EUSRs remain a 
distinctive CFSP instrument with a 
separate financing source and a special 
relation to the Council”.  
The focus therefore is on maintaining the 
existing legal framework for EUSRs as 
provided by the TEU, but making practical 
improvements to ensure that EUSRs are not 
left floating in limbo, and that maximum 
use is made of their added value to the EU 
                                                   
4 See S. Blockmans and C. Hillion (eds), “EEAS 
2.0 – Recommendations for the amendment of 
Council decision 2010/427/EU establishing the 
organization and functioning of the EEAS”, 
CEPS Special Report, CEPS, Brussels, 
November 2013. 
foreign and security policy. Proposals in 
this respect have included the setting up of 
an EUSR task force in the EEAS, which 
would ensure an operational anchor for 
EUSRs. Its tasks would include identifying 
best practices, drafting a handbook or vade 
mecum, optimising administrative staff 
resources attributed to each EUSR and 
ensuring the important element of 
continuity and institutional memory 
between outgoing and incoming EUSRs. 
This system has been in place since 2012 in 
the OSCE context, with the Conflict 
Prevention Centre acting as a focal point for 
debriefing successive Special 
Representatives for protracted conflicts 
appointed by the OSCE Chair-in-Office. 
Although the task force proposal was not 
pursued, the above suggested actions both 
to improve the administrative support for 
EUSRs and to ensure continuity and 
institutional memory remain valid.  
A number of other improvements should be 
undertaken, not least that relating to gender 
balance - with the nine EUSRs being all male, 
there is an obvious need to ensure greater 
responsiveness to issues related to gender in 
future appointments.  
In the EEAS organigram (appended as a 
PDF at the end of this Policy Brief), the 
EUSRs appear at the bottom of the chart as 
if floating in an institutional vacuum.6 Even 
if the EUSRs are not strictly speaking an 
integral part of the EEAS, it should 
nevertheless be possible to adapt the 
organigramme in order to better reflect the 
HR/VP’s intention of ‘functional 
integration’, by e.g. creating a direct link to 
the relevant geographical managing 
directorate or thematic area. This could 
5  For further information on these 
developments, see “The EU Special 
Representative: A dying breed?”, CEPS 
Commentary, CEPS, Brussels, 12 December, 
2013. 
6  See https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/ 
headquarters-homepage/3602/organisation-
chart-of-the-eeas_en.  
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help address the current ambiguities in the 
EUSR/EEAS relationship. 
Expanding the network of EUSRs? 
It remains an open question whether the 
HR/VP intends to expand the network of 
EUSRs into other regions or policy areas. 
Much will depend on the various plans of 
action to be developed for the 
implementation of the different elements 
set out in the EU’s Global Security Strategy. 
Some of these elements may lend 
themselves to an EUSR option if it is felt 
that the current EU institutional framework 
is not able for budgetary or resource 
reasons to address them.  
One geographical region that certainly 
merits consideration, particularly if the 
current ‘double-hatted’ model is 
terminated (see below), is the Balkan 
region. The argument that this region is 
part of the EU’s enlargement agenda, and 
therefore cannot be considered in the CFSP 
context, may satisfy strict institutional 
orthodoxy, but it does not make sense 
when one is confronted with the political 
reality in the region itself. The legacy of the 
past still weighs heavily in this region, with 
ongoing bilateral border disputes, minority 
rights and other sensitive issues casting a 
shadow over the entire region and 
requiring greater attention and a higher 
degree of political awareness on the part of 
the EU.  
A policy area that could certainly lend itself 
to the consideration of an EUSR relates to 
migration and the ongoing refugee crisis, 
which has sorely tested the EU’s resolve 
and capacity to act. While certainly not a 
panacea for quick solutions, the 
appointment of an EUSR in this area could 
help ensure greater coherence and more 
focused policy development within the EU, 
which after all, is probably the region in the 
world most affected in recent times by the 
refugee crisis and migration flows. It is 
noteworthy in this respect that the UN 
Secretary General has his own Special 
Representative for International Migration, 
Peter Sutherland, who was appointed in 
2006; this is in addition to the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees. 
Double-hatted EUSRs and Special 
Envoys 
In the above-mentioned letter, the HR/VP 
also set out her ideas on the ‘double hatted’ 
EUSRs and on the appointment of Special 
Envoys. 
a) ‘Double-hatted’ EUSRs 
Basing herself on the logic of a fully 
implemented Lisbon Treaty, with the 
transformation of existing delegations into 
fully fledged EU delegations, the HR/VP 
considers that the function of ‘double-
hatted’ EUSRs is now redundant. She has 
proposed that the system be phased out by 
the end of the current mandate of the three 
remaining ‘double-hatted’ EUSRs in 
February 2017. Her proposal is currently on 
the table of the PSC for discussion. Initial 
reaction from member states has been 
reserved to say the least, with some fearing 
a loss of control over a ‘privileged ear’, 
which the EUSRs provide through their 
direct reporting to the PSC, and in the case 
notably of the UK (admittedly perhaps less 
important now following the referendum), 
which felt this change would give more 
power to the EU institutions. 
There is no doubt that the circumstances in 
which the ‘double-hatted’ model was born 
in 2005, with the appointment of the first 
EUSR/Head of European Commission 
delegation in Macedonia, have evolved 
over the years. At that time, with the 
growth of EU military and police missions 
established under the CFSP in the Western 
Balkan region, and an increased number of 
EU actors on the ground, it was felt that the 
much-needed coherence and coordination 
between the different actors was only 
possible by merging the political/security 
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dimension together with the traditional 
community tasks. Thus the ‘personal 
union’ of EUSR and Head of Delegation 
was born, overcoming the many 
institutional headaches that were raised by 
those who considered this innovation as 
institutional heresy. 7  The success of the 
Macedonian example spurred other 
‘double-hatted’ appointments, in Bosnia 
and Hercegovina, Kosovo, the African 
Union and Afghanistan. 
Today the situation is clearly different. 
Almost seven years have passed since the 
implementation of the new arrangements 
under the Lisbon Treaty. The delegations of 
the EU have had time to adapt to their 
enhanced political mandate, and greater 
efforts have been undertaken to ensure 
maximum coordination at headquarters 
between the various policy instruments, 
CFSP missions where they exist and the 
traditional development assistance. While 
by no means perfect and with more needed 
to be done to ensure that the degree of 
synergy between the institutions fully 
reflects the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty, 
coherence within the institutions, 
particularly between the Commission and 
the EEAS, has reached a higher level than 
heretofore. In this respect, therefore, the 
‘personal union’ model can be perceived as 
a relic from the past, and no longer 
necessary.  
Impact of closure 
 Its closure does raise however a number of 
sensitive issues, both political and 
administrative, which need to be addressed 
before closure actually happens.  
While the institutional arguments put 
forward by the HR/VP may be understood 
within the Brussels bubble, the perception 
in the host countries is likely to be quite 
different. No matter how much effort the 
                                                   
7  The appointment of the present author as 
EUSR and HOD in Macedonia was announced 
simultaneously by both the European 
HR/VP deploys in explaining the reasons 
for ending the practice, many of the EU’s 
interlocutors will perceive it as the EU 
downgrading its commitment to the 
country as well as diminishing the stature 
and role of the EUSR/HOD.  
It would be like removing a few stripes from the 
uniform of a jumbo jet pilot while in mid-flight.  
A phased approach is the best approach 
It would make more sense therefore if the 
change were to happen upon the 
appointment of a new HOD in each 
country, instead of setting the arbitrary 
date of February 2017 for all three. This 
could also help to at least partially offset 
the likely conclusion by the host 
governments that by ending the ‘double-
hatted’ model, the EU sees their countries 
as no longer posing security risks, which 
certainly is not the case unfortunately. 
Indeed it can be argued, certainly in the 
case of the Balkans, that despite the EU 
enlargement process, security risks have 
grown in that region. The appointment of a 
new HOD would provide the right 
opportunity for the HR/VP to emphasise 
that under the new arrangements, 
including reinforced capacities in the 
delegations, the HOD is equally competent 
as heretofore to address security issues that 
may arise.  
A phased approach would also enable the 
particular circumstances prevailing in each 
‘double-hatted’ location to be properly 
addressed. For example:  
 In the case of Kosovo, the EUSR has 
been given specific tasks under the EU 
facilitated dialogue between Pristina 
and Belgrade. Transferring these tasks 
to the new HOD will require careful 
and advance planning. 
Commission and the Council on 17 October 
2005, precisely in order to avoid the perception 
that one hat would be subservient to another. 
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 Equally challenging will be the case of 
Afghanistan and the ongoing EUPOL 
(Afghanistan). 8  Because of the 
continued EU commitment to support 
the Afghan National Police Force, a 
follow-up body is likely to be required 
once the Mission itself is terminated. 
This would presumably have to be 
located within the existing EU 
delegation, although it is an issue that 
remains yet to be decided. Meanwhile 
the question of how this will be 
financed is caught up in the ongoing 
complex debate within the PSC over 
the use of Art. 28 TEU (CFSP budget), 
thus further complicating the 
HR/VP’s proposal to terminate the 
EUSR hat by February 2017.  
It goes without saying that once the 
‘double-hatted’ model is terminated, the 
HR/VP should devote extra care in the 
selection of the new HOD in these 
countries, to ensure not only continuity in 
the work previously undertaken by the 
EUSR but also relevant expertise in the 
field of mediation as the EU expands its 
peace-building role. Indeed the same 
considerations should apply to the 
appointment of HODs in all countries and 
regions prone to conflict.  
The most difficult issue to resolve will be 
budgetary and administrative – how to 
ensure sufficient funds are provided for in 
the EEAS administrative budget to cover 
the extra staff posts to be created in the 
delegations. Most of the EUSR staff will 
need to be incorporated into the 
delegations to ensure that EUSR tasks are 
adequately covered. Even if the request to 
the EU budget authority has already been 
made, it is by no means certain that it will 
be approved, or done so prior to the 
proposed closure date of February 2017, 
leaving in limbo many dedicated staff 
                                                   
8  The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan, 
established in 2007, has had its mission 
extended until 31 December 2016. 
members who have put their faith in the 
EU. This situations provides another 
reason therefore to adopt a phased 
approach for each case. 
Other important factors that enhanced the 
effectiveness of the ‘double-hatted’ EUSRs 
relate both to their operational flexibility 
and the extra budget resources at their 
disposal. The HR/VP will need to convince 
member states that these elements will 
remain once the EUSR hat disappears. 
Rigidity in the budgetary as well as staff 
recruitment procedures under which 
delegations operate has always been and 
remains a major management challenge for 
the EU’s diplomatic service.  
b) EU Special Envoys  
There are currently three in place, one for 
non-proliferation and disarmament, one 
for space and one for the peace talks in 
Colombia. However there are differences 
in status between these three. The first two 
were appointed as part of the EEAS 
structure and operate under the 
responsibility of the EEAS Secretary 
General (and they also appear in the EEAS 
organigramme but in a different colour to 
that of the EUSRs). The third Special Envoy 
was appointed by the HR/VP and operates 
under her direct authority (but does not 
appear in the organigramme). Needless to 
say, this adds some confusion to the notion 
of EU Special Envoy. 
As stated by the HR/VP in her letter of 7 
October 2015, the Special Envoy formula 
should be linked to a specific process with 
a limited time span requiring “an elevated 
EU profile”. In this respect, she is clearly 
referring to the third case, with the 
appointment in October 2015 of former 
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister of Ireland, Eamon Gilmore, as 
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Special Envoy for the Peace Process in 
Colombia. 
What particularly differentiates a Special 
Envoy (of the stature comparable to that of 
the Special Envoy for Colombia) from the 
EUSR is institutional, in that the former is 
directly appointed by the HR/VP with no 
Council Decision required, meaning in 
theory reduced PSC oversight.  
Although it might be suggested that 
member states would be reluctant to see a 
proliferation of such Special Envoys, it is 
interesting to note in this respect the 
HR/VP’s remarks following the July 
Foreign Affairs Council, where she agreed 
to consider the suggestion made by “some 
ministers” as she put it, to appoint a Special 
Envoy for the crisis in Venezuela, in this 
case the former PM of Spain (Jose Luis 
Rodriguez Zapatero). Her remarks were 
however couched in very cautious terms, 
reflecting perhaps her reluctance to use this 
resource in the future. 
The question as to whether it should be a 
EUSR or a Special Envoy will very much 
depend on the particular circumstances of 
each case; as she herself put it: “Elements 
such as the need for visibility, rapid 
response, flexibility, political oversight, no 
duplication and budgetary availability 
have to be taken into consideration when 
deciding upon the options.” As the EEAS 
and the EU’s diplomatic service continues 
to consolidate its place on the world stage, 
the chances of an increased number of 
Special Envoys will probably remain 
limited. 
At the same time, it should remain an 
option. The lead time to put an EUSR in 
place can be several months. There have 
been occasions, and there will likely be 
more in the future, where the rapid 
deployment of an enhanced high-profile, 
                                                   
9 European Commission Press Release, Vatican 
City, 6 May 2016. 
short-term EU presence could make the 
difference in diffusing a political crisis with 
security implications.  
It should also be noted in passing that 
Special Envoys are not the preserve of the 
HR/VP. Earlier this year, President Juncker 
announced the appointment of the ‘first 
Special Envoy’ for the promotion of 
freedom of religion or belief outside the 
EU.9 
EUSRs and the EU Global Strategy 
for Foreign and Security Policy 
In the chapter relating to “An Integrated 
Approach to Conflicts and Crises”, the 
HR/VP underlines the importance of 
expanding the “comprehensive approach” 
to the conflict cycle and commits the EU to 
pursuing a “multi-phased”, “multilateral” 
and “multi-level” approach, and investing 
in “prevention, resolution and stabilization 
and avoid premature disengagement”. In 
respect of “pre-emptive peace building and 
diplomacy”, the HR/VP highlights the 
determination to engage in preventive 
diplomacy and mediation by “mobilising 
EU delegations and Special 
Representatives, and deepening 
partnerships with civil society”.10 
This focus on preventive diplomacy and 
mediation is certainly welcome and 
underlines the HR/VP’s commitment to 
strengthening the EU’s peace-building role. 
With the increase of conflict or potential 
conflict situations, whether intra-state or 
inter-state, the EU will need to be more pro-
active and ready to deploy its resources to 
maximum effect. This presupposes once 
again that the delegations are equipped 
with the necessary training and skills to 
become engaged, and to identify at the 
earliest stage potential conflict flash points. 
Early warning can make the difference 
10 “EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security 
Policy – Shared Vision, Common Action, A 
Stronger Europe”, June 2016, pp. 28-30. 
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between success or failure of the EU’s 
preventive diplomacy efforts. In this 
respect, her intention of “beefing up 
political sections of delegations and 
encouraging operational staff to use their 
expertise more politically” is particularly 
welcome.11 
To achieve this, ensuring proper and 
continued targeted training for delegation 
personnel at all levels will be essential. This 
is an area where the institutions have been 
notoriously weak, largely due to 
insufficient budget resources. If the HR/VP 
is committed to effectively enhance the 
EU’s mediation and peace-building role, 
the necessary budgetary resources will 
need to be provided. At the same time, it 
presupposes the presence of a HOD with 
the necessary leadership and mediation 
skills together with sufficient resources to 
steer the delegation in that direction. At the 
end of the day, it is personalities at the 
leadership level that play a crucial part and 
can make the difference between success 
and muddling through in a given crisis or 
conflict situation.  
All of the above elements, together with 
that relating to civil society (see below) will 
hopefully be taken into account by the 
HR/VP as she prepares the plan of action 
for implementation of the Global Security 
Strategy. They are also areas that will lend 
themselves to greater interaction with both 
the UN and the OSCE, both of which have 
developed well-established guidelines in 
conflict mediation as well as in gender 
responsiveness in addressing conflict 
situations. 
The role of civil society in peace-
building 
A contributing factor to success in the EU’s 
peace-building efforts will also be 
interaction with civil society. This needs to 
be reinforced both at headquarter level and 
                                                   
11 Ibid., p. 48. 
in the field through the delegations, as well 
as the EUSRs. It is often in conflict 
situations that the focus tends to be 
exclusively on the political elites and 
established political parties. Interaction 
with civil society is usually added on 
towards the end of a process only as an 
afterthought, despite the fact that involving 
civil society at an early stage is the only 
way to guarantee accountability of the 
political leaders and a return to democratic 
standards in the long run. Civil society also 
plays a crucial role in the confidence-
building measures, which are an essential 
element if a peace process is to succeed.  
There are many examples of conflict 
resolution and post-conflict peace 
processes (Northern Ireland, South Africa, 
to mention but two) where the involvement 
of civil society organisations at an early 
stage has contributed to a more sustainable 
and ultimately more successful peace 
process. The recent peace agreement 
between the Colombian government and 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) is the latest example. In 
the Transdniestrian settlement process, 
inclusion in the process of a strand for civil 
society interaction from both sides of the 
Nistru River helps to build relationships of 
trust and thus lay the foundations for a 
final settlement, which admittedly in this 
case is still far away.  
On the other hand, merely playing lip 
service to a token engagement with civil 
society in a conflict situation will not bring 
lasting peace. The ongoing crisis in 
Macedonia is a classic example where, 
despite playing a critical role, civil society 
has, regrettably, been largely ignored in the 
EU-mediated process. Whether at the level 
of the Commissioner responsible or out in 
the field, little effort has been made to 
engage with civil society during the past 
year, despite the fact that a large group of 
civil society organisations had come 
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together in an unprecedented level of 
coordination with their “Blueprint for 
Urgent Democratic Reforms”, presented on 
8 July 2016, as a contribution to the 
negotiations mediated by the EU.  
The HR/VP speaks of developing ‘’more 
creative approaches to diplomacy’’ in 
conflict settlement. Interaction with civil 
society is certainly one area where this 
objective should be put into practice. 
Conclusion  
A recurring phrase in the above-mentioned 
EU Global Security Strategy relates to 
“Investing in the State and Societal 
Resilience”, and the different paths to 
“resilience”, which the EU will support in 
its foreign policy. To achieve this, it will 
have to deploy all the resources at its 
disposal in the most effective manner 
possible. Part of these resources include the 
EUSRs, whose resilience has stood the test 
of time, despite or perhaps because of the 
ad hoc institutional arrangements on which 
they have been based.  
The key challenge facing the HR/VP will 
be to persuade all the institutions, the EU 
delegations, EUSRs and instruments to 
work together for the common purpose, in 
the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty, of achieving 
the goals set out in the EU Global Security 
Strategy, or to use her own words, having 
“an orchestra which plays from the same 
score”. 
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